By William Oliver Stevens; Allan F Westcott
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Before everything of global warfare I a brand new and powerful chance to Britain's naval supremacy took form within the kind of the Kaiser's Imperial German submarines, due to their lately bought skill to submerge and stalk their adversaries. A submarine's staff couldn't board and catch a service provider send, despite the fact that, and first and foremost the German management used to be reluctant to reserve their U-boat captains to exploit gunfire or torpedoes to sink merchantmen - crewed by means of civilian seamen - a result of anticipated opposed response of impartial international locations corresponding to the U.S..
On the junction of 3 nice continents and oceanic alternate routes that hyperlink the towns of the area, the Persian Gulf, like a magnet, has pulled strong countries into its waters and adjoining lands for hundreds of years. This research examines the contested heritage for regulate of the Gulf and its assets, targeting Portugal, Holland, Britain, and the USA, and concludes with a glance at attainable destiny involvement through India and China.
Regardless of being particularly unknown in comparison to well-known ships like Graf Spee or Bismarke, or the extra recognized U-boats, the Auxiliary Cruisers have been immensely profitable, not just within the variety of enemy ships they sank, yet within the assets that have been tied up attempting to song them down. The Royal Navy's auxiliary cruisers tended to be service provider vessels used to guard convoys from assault.
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Extra resources for A history of sea power
The Admiralty may have been hoping to secu're its new standard 'by the back door,' for if its new interpretation of the one-power standard gained currency, the only point remaining for debate would be the difference between a 'deterrent' force and one capable of providing 'full security' for British interests. A naval victory in such a debate would have created a de facto two-power standard. In any event, this definition of the one-power standard was eventually accepted throughout Whitehall as the approved definition - a victory by default, which the navy slipped past the notice of the Treasury and of many historians.
To do so, it had to win the interdepartmental battle over how the standard would be interpreted. Would it apply only to capital ships, or should it cover other classes as well? Did equality mean numerical equality in warsh ips or parity in fighting power? Should requirements be calculated on the basis of equality in home, neutral, or enemy waters? All of the departments concerned with naval matters realized that the answers to these questions would have a significant impact on the Admiralty's ability to secure its future programs.
That is the foundation of the Naval Policy of His Majesty's Government. 2 7 This announcement was in fact a substantial victory for the Admiralty. Against formidable opposition it had secured a naval standard relative to the United States, a power it freely admitted Britain was unlikely ever to face in war; it obtained the only standard which might conceivably allow it to resume construction of capital ships in the near future; and it received a public commitment to this standard, which no future cabinet could renounce without risking political and public protest.